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Abstract
A prediction of the endogenous growth models with quality ladders
is that there exists a negative relation between growth and the degree
of market competition.
The aim of this article is to shed light on the relation between com-
petition and growth when horizontal and vertical innovations can si-
multaneously occur by adopting the structure of the patent race model;
we show the way in which the toughness of competition in
uences the
rms' incentives to invest in the two R&D activities; in particular, the
presence of vertical and horizontal dierentiation can determine a non
monotonic long run relationship between competition and growth.
JEL classication: O31, O41
Key words: Growth, Competition, Vertical and Horizontal Inno-
vations.
1 Introduction
A conclusion that comes from the endogenous growth models with qual-
ity ladders is that there exists a negative relation between competition and
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1growth (see Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992));
in these models, the innovative process is described as a progressive incre-
ment of the productivity of the intermediate goods that are adopted in the
nal good production with a constant substitution elasticity. The protec-
tion of intellectual property rights on the inventions is based on the patents
system. The process of technological competition is formalized according to
the structure of the patent race models: the successful innovator is always
able to leapfrog the leader and monopolize the market of the intermediate
good. At every point in time the only active rm in each industry is the
technological leader; for this reason, it is natural to measure the degree
of competition by the inverse of the elasticity of demand, which is related
with the size of the mark-up that the leader charges. The negative relation-
ship between competition and growth is based on the fact that an increase
of the substitution elasticity between varieties of intermediate goods in
u-
ences negatively the incentives to invest in R&D by reducing the expected
monopoly prots of future innovators.
In the growth models with horizontal innovations (expanding-varieties
models), the relation between competition and growth can be either positive
or negative; in particular, Bucci (2002) showed that such a relation depends
on the type of technology used in the productions sectors, the dimension of
the market power and the intensity of competition between R&D activity
and production for the same input.
In this article, we re-examine the relation between competition and
growth when horizontal and vertical innovations can simultaneously occur
by using a model close to Howitt (1999).1 In presence of vertical and hori-
zontal innovations, we show the way in which the toughness of competition
in
uences the rms' incentives to invest in the two R&D activities; in par-
ticular, we get a non monotonic long run relationship between competition
and growth for plausible parameterizations. This conclusion is akin to recent
results in industrial organization (see Boone (2000) and (2001)) that show,
in a partial equilibrium framework, the non-monotone relation between in-
tensity of competition and the incentive to innovate.
1We will outline some light dierences between the model we adopt and Howitt (1999).
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present




We consider an economy in which the growth rate of population is constant
and the labor market is perfect; the inelastic supply of labor L is instan-
taneously employed in the production sector of the nal and intermediate
goods. Workers can be hired by intermediate good rms producing their
products on a one to one basis from labor and perfectly competitive rms
in the nal good production. R&D activities consist in discovering new in-
termediate products (horizontal innovations) and improving the quality of
the existing varieties (vertical innovations).
As is standard in this literature, any rm that innovates receives a patent
on its innovation and does not have to worry about the imitation of other
rms because there is perfect enforcement of patent rights. This implies
that a rm that horizontally innovates keeps a monopolistic position until
the next vertical innovation occurs in its industry; in fact, each monopoly
is challenged by outsider R&D rms that try to invent a product of better
quality in order to drive the former monopolist out of the market.2
2.1.1 Final good production
Assuming perfect competition in the nal good sector, the aggregate pro-






!td!, with ! 2 [0;Nt], (1)
2In fact, without R&D cost or rst-move advantages, current industry leaders do not
participate in vertical R&D races. This is due to the fact that there exists a dierence of
incentives between current industry leaders and outsiders (known as \replacement eect"
of Arrow (1962)) because leaders have less to gain from vertical innovations than other
rms. This implies that outsiders win the race for obtaining the innovation.
3where Yt denotes the total output, Lyt the labor input devoted to produc-
tion, x!t the amount employed of the !th type of intermediate good, q!t
the quality level attached to it at time t, Nt the number of intermediate
goods and the mass of active local monopolies and  2 (0;1) a coecient
that determines the demand elasticity for the intermediate good. The aggre-
gate production function exhibits constant returns in labor and intermediate
products.3
Final output is allocated among vertical R&D expenditure Hvt, horizon-
tal R&D expenditure Hht and total consumption Ct:
Yt = Hvt + Hht + Ct.
We assume that the production of a unit of good x!t requires a quantity of
labor equal to Lx!t, that is:
x!t = Lx!t.













taking the wage rate wt and the price of the !th type of intermediate good












which express respectively the demand for the intermediate good ! and
labor Lyt. It is interesting to observe that the demand for the intermediate
good ! exhibits a constant price elasticity equal to 1=(1   ).
3Labor is an input in the nal-good production. In Howitt (1999) labor is not used in
the nal sector.
42.1.2 Intermediate good production
A rm that horizontally innovates is able to earn monopoly prots until the
next vertical innovation occurs in its industry; every leader rm is driven
out of business by successful vertical R&D activity.
The incumbent producer of intermediate product has a total cost of
production wtx!t; given the demand for product ! in eq. (2), the rm will
price the intermediate good in order to maximize its prot !t = x!t(p!t  





which implies that each producer imposes a constant mark-up 1= over the
marginal cost wt.
If we substitute for p!t from eq. (4) into (2), the quantity produced of








and the prot 
ow in industry ! equals:










The representative consumer supplies a unit of labor inelastically in every





where  > 0 is the rate of time preference and ct is the consumer's expen-
diture at time t. The problem of maximization of utility is subject to the






we rtdt + A0, (8)
that means that the present value of the consumption expense of the rep-
resentative agent must be lower or equal to his wealth, that is dened as
5the sum of the present value of the 
ow of the future income and the initial
nancial wealth (A0). From the maximization problem we get:
r = ,
which states that the market interest rate must equal  throughout time.
2.2 Innovative activity
Firms engage in vertical and horizontal R&D activity and technological
progress shows up as quality improvements for the intermediate products
and expansion of the number of varieties of producer goods.
Vertical innovations correspond with a process of upgrading and result
in new intermediate products that embody the state-of-the-art quality level
at time t, qt.4
The leading-edge quality qt grows proportionally to the aggregate rate
of vertical innovations t where the factor of proportionality is equal to
=Nt; this implies that the marginal impact of each vertical innovation on
the aggregate economy depends negatively on the number of intermediate
goods. Since the aggregate rate of vertical innovations equals the number of
intermediate sectors Nt times the rate of vertical innovations in each sector















where  > 0 is a spillover parameter.
Horizontal innovations create new industries increasing the number of
intermediate goods, Nt. Following Howitt (1999), we assume that each
horizontal innovation results in a new intermediate product whose quality
level q!t is drawn randomly from the existing distribution of quality levels
across industries.
2.2.1 The rewards for innovating
The reward for a vertical innovation is the expected discounted value of
prot 
ows earned by the innovative rm before being replaced by the next
4In other terms, qt  maxfq!t;! 2 [0;Nt]g.
6innovator in its industry. More precisely, in each intermediate sector the
successful innovator enters into Bertrand competition with the previous in-
cumbent in that sector. As a consequence of competition, the previous
incumbent is obliged to exit and cannot threaten to re-enter; this means
that a successful innovator can charge the monopolist price.








where the term !t indicates the instantaneous prot of the rm that pro-
duces the intermediate good ! at time  when the technology is of vintage
t.
Since each horizontal innovation results in a new intermediate product
whose quality level q!t is drawn randomly from the distribution of quality
levels across existing industries, the quality distribution of new intermediate
goods is identical to the quality distribution of existing ones; from eq. (6)











As shown by Howitt (1999) and Segerstrom (2000), the distribution a!t 
q!t=qt converges monotonically to the invariant distribution:5
Pr(q!t  qt) = F (a) = a
1
.
Since we will focus on the steady state equilibrium properties of this model,
we assume that the distribution of relative quality levels is equal to F (a)















( + 1   )
. (12)
5See the Appendix (the distribution of relative productivities) in Segerstrom (2000) for
more details.
72.2.2 Vertical R&D activity
We assume that vertical innovations follow a Poisson process with a common
arrival rate given by:
!t = vHvt=(Ntqt),
where v is a vertical R&D productivity parameter, and the vertical R&D
expenditure 
ow Hvt is de
ated by the leading-edge quality.6 The expected





t is the expected value of a vertical innovation. Vertical R&D rms
choose Hvt=Nt in order to maximize the previous expression. This gives:
vv
t=qt = 1, (13)
which corresponds with the usual requirement that the marginal expected
benet of an additional unit of vertical R&D equals its marginal cost.
2.2.3 Horizontal R&D activity
We assume that the creation of new industries occurs at the following rate:7




t =qt with 0 <   < 1,
where h is a horizontal R&D productivity parameter,   measures the de-
gree of diminishing returns to horizontal R&D expenditure and the two
inputs Hht and Yt are de
ated by the leading-edge quality. The expected

ow of net prots obtained by a horizontal innovation is equal to:
_ Nth
t   Hht.







t =qt = 1, (14)
6This means that the complexity of vertical innovations increases proportionally to the
technological progress.
7Howitt (1999) does not specify the function for the process of new product innovation.
8which corresponds with the usual requirement that the marginal expected
benet of an additional unit of horizontal R&D equals its marginal cost.
Denoting ht = Hht=Yt the fraction of total output that is allocated to hori-
zontal R&D activity, eq. (14) becomes:
h (ht)
  1 h
t =qt = 1. (15)
2.3 Steady state
In steady state all the endogenous variables grow at constant rates over time;
since total output is allocated between consumption, horizontal R&D ex-
penditure and vertical R&D expenditure, the fraction of aggregate product
devoted to horizontal R&D activity h does not change over time. Since gqt
is constant over time in a balanced growth path, the Poisson arrival rate of
vertical innovations in eq. (9) must be also constant. In steady state the
growth rates of quality and variety can be written as:
gq = vv and (16)
gN = hh y, (17)
where v = Hvt=(qtNt) and y = Yt=(qtNt) are stationary in a balanced growth
equilibrium.
2.3.1 The growth rate of the real wage

































 + 1   
(1 )
. (19)
which implies that the growth rate of the real wage equals:
g = gq + (1   )gN. (20)
92.3.2 The equilibrium in the labor market
Workers are employed to produce intermediate or nal goods. The full-
employment condition on the labor market is:












Using eq. (3), (19) and (21), the ratio of output to qtNt, yt (that is constant



























Taking logs of both sides and dierentiating with respect to time, we get:
gN = gL=, (23)
where the population growth rate gL is exogenously given.
2.3.3 The vertical R&D condition
From eq. (6), the monopoly prot 
ow at time  for a rm whose technology
is of vintage t is equal to:









where w = wt expfg(   t)g in a balanced growth path. We can evaluate












 +    gL
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 +    gL
=




 +    gL
, (24)
10where yt = Yt=(Ntqt). The discount rate in the denominator of (24) includes
four terms: the rate of time preference , the rate of vertical innovation
in each sector gq= representing the creative destruction eect, the rate of
gradual crowding out g=(1 ) due to the fact that wages rise continually8
and the population growth rate gL.
Substituting v
t into (13), we get:




 +    gL
= 1, (25)
which represents the vertical R&D protability relation in steady state.
2.3.4 The horizontal R&D condition
By using eq. (11), (12), (15) and (24), the horizontal R&D condition is:




 +    gL
= 1. (26)
It represents the steady state relation of horizontal R&D protability.
2.3.5 Solution
The population growth condition (23), the vertical R&D condition (25) and
the horizontal R&D condition (26) represent a system of three equations
in h, v and y that must be satised in the steady state equilibrium given
(16), (17) and (20). We can show that there exists a unique solution to this
system with positive g if  <  (1   )gL=h.9
8In fact, a successful innovator's prots are subject not only to the usual destruction
by the next innovator in the same product line but also to crowding out by the continual
rise in wages at the steady rate g.
9By using eq. (17), (20) and (23), we can write eq. (26) as:
1 =







It is quite simple to verify that function (gq) satises the following properties: (a) (0) =
 (1 )gL=h
 , (b) the limit of (gq) is zero when gq tends to innity, (c) (gq) is strictly
increasing in gL. From these properties follows that for  <  (1   )gL=h there exists
only one strictly positive steady state.
113 Competition and the incentives to conduct R&D
activity
We study the way in which competition on the intermediate goods sector
in
uences the rms' incentives to engage in vertical and horizontal R&D ac-
tivity through an analysis of comparative statics; Aghion and Howitt (1998)
follow the same approach in a schumpeterian model of vertical innovations.
We point out the fact that in eq. (4) the monopoly power 1= is in-
versely related to the elasticity of substitution of the intermediate goods
(equal to 1=(1   )). The reason is that the intermediate products become
more and more similar when  increases since their elasticity of substitution
augments; the price elasticity of the demand faced by the local monopolist
(equal to 1=(1   )) is positively in
uenced and tends to be innitely large
when  tends to innity. This means that the toughness of competition
in the intermediate goods sector can be approximately measured by ; in
particular, the larger  is, the more competitive the market is.
We observe that the vertical R&D condition (25) and the horizontal
R&D condition (26) must simultaneously hold in the steady state equilib-
rium; this implies that:
v
( + 1   )
(1   )
= h h  1, (27)
whose interpretation is that the horizontal R&D intensity h is independent
of the growth rate g because there is only one value of h in correspondence
of which the marginal expected benet of vertical R&D equals the marginal
expected benet of horizontal R&D.
According to eq. (27), the horizontal R&D intensity h is negatively
in
uenced by the competitiveness coecient .10 The variety growth rate
gN, that is a function of the horizontal R&D intensity h, depends also
negatively on the parameter  in eq. (23). The intuition of this result is
based on eq. (11) that plays a crucial role in determining the incentives
to conduct vertical and horizontal R&D activity. In particular, since each





(1  ) . We can see that the
fraction of total product allocated to horizontal R&D depends also on the parameters
aecting the productivity of the two kinds of R&D activity.
12horizontal innovation results in a new intermediate product whose quality
level is drawn randomly from the existing distribution of quality levels across
industries and vertical innovations result in new intermediate product that
embody the state-of-the-art quality level, the reward of a vertical innovation






in eq. (11) decreases and this enlarges the gap
between the two rewards: as a reaction, rms tend to reduce the horizontal
R&D investment.
Instead, the relationship between  and the quality growth rate gq de-
pends on the change of the horizontal R&D intensity h. By using eq. (17),
(20), (23) and (26), after some algebra we get that the quality growth rate
gq equals:
gq =






Looking at the previous equation, we identify three dierent eects produced
by an increase of the competitiveness coecient :
(i) a negative eect (appropriability effect) working through the term
(1   ) in the numerator of (28) because an increase of  reduces the in-
centives to innovate by diminishing the size of monopoly rents that can be
appropriated by successful innovators;
(ii) a negative eect (obsolescence effect) working through the term
=(1   ) in the denominator of (28) because growth in the leading edge
produces a detrimental eect on existing rents by rendering the previous
innovators' technologies obsolete;
(iii) a positive eect (that we call R&D allocation effect) working
through the term h in the numerator of (28) because as  increases, the
horizontal R&D intensity decreases, exerting an upward pressure on the
quality growth rate gq.
We shed light on this positive eect by observing that according to eq.






The previous equation shows that the horizontal R&D intensity in
uences
negatively the productivity-adjusted output. This implies that a decrease
13in h raises y, which in turn increases the prot 
ow of a successful vertical
innovator (see eq. (24)), and encourages investment in vertical R&D activ-
ity. Naturally, this positive eect is absent in the analysis of Aghion and
Howitt (1998) because they consider only vertical innovations.
The relation between the quality growth rate gq and  depends on the
combination of the previous three eects:
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We observe that, when  increases, the R&D allocation effect dominates
the appropriability effect when the spillover parameter  is large enough,
that is:
 >
(1   )(1    )
 
. (A)
Condition (A) can be interpreted by observing the fact that growth in the
leading-edge quality depends positively on the spillover parameter  ac-
cording to eq. (9) and therefore, when a horizontal innovation occurs, the
probability to draw a quality level smaller than the leading-edge one (from
the existing distribution) increases in .





in eq. (11) decreases in
 (see eq. (12) at this regard) and the dierence between the reward of a
vertical innovation and a horizontal one enlarges: this means that the R&D
allocation effect that is based on the reduction of h becomes important
when  is large enough.
Moreover, considering the vertical innovator's expected gain as an appro-
priate measure of the incentive to innovate, it is interesting to observe that
the relation between competition toughness and innovation is non-monotone
(U shape) for low values of  (meaning that is there is a small probability
to draw a quality level lower than the leading-edge one), while for high
values of , the relation is monotone. Numerical simulations show that,
under condition (A), we have a non-monotone relationship between inten-
sity of competition and growth. Figure 1 illustrates the relations between

























Figure 1: Competition and growth
the economy growth rate,11 the quality growth rate and the competitiveness
coecient, under the parameter values reported in Table 1:
gL     h v
0:015 0:4 0:06 0:6 0:5 0:5
Table 1: Parameter values
In Figure 1 we plot two curves (a) and (b) representing the relations
between g and  and gq and  respectively. The interesting feature of this
gure is the non-monotonicity of the relationship between the intensity of
competition and the resulting economy growth rate for admissible parame-
terizations.
4 Conclusion
The main motivation of this article has been to re-examine the relation be-
tween the competitive structure of product market and economic growth by
11We use eq. (20) and (23).
15using a patent race model close to Howitt (1999). We got that the rela-
tion between competition and growth could be non-monotone in presence
of horizontal and vertical innovations. The result is interesting at the light
of some recent works in industrial organization. Boone (2000) and (2001)
analyzed the eects of competitive pressure on the incentives to invest in
product and process innovations in a partial equilibrium framework; the
Author showed that the relation between intensity of competition and the
incentive to innovate is non-monotone. Our result is also in accordance with
D'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gerard-Varet (2002) that studied
the relationship between toughness of competition in the product market,
strategic R&D investment and economic growth in an overlapping genera-
tions model (rms and consumers have a two-period life) with uncertainty
in which rms invest in R&D during the rst period and compete in the
product market in the second period; in fact, their main conclusion was the
non-monotonicity of the relation between the toughness of the competition
regime and the incentives to innovate.
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